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Abstract  
Systems engineering involves both the integration of the system and the integration of the disciplines which develop 
and operate the system.  Integrating the disciplines is a sociological effort to bring together different groups, who often 
have different terminology, to achieve a common goal, the system.  The focus for the systems engineer is information 
flow through the organization, between the disciplines, to ensure the system is developed and operated will all relevant 
information informing system decisions. The practical application of the sociology in systems engineering brings in 
various organizational development concepts including the principles of planned renegotiation and the application of 
principles to address information barriers created by organizational culture.  Concepts such as specification of 
ignorance, consistent terminology, opportunity structures, role-sets, and the reclama (reconsideration) process are all 
important sociological approaches that help address the organizational social structure (culture).  In bringing the 
disciplines together, the systems engineer must also be wary of social ambivalence, social anomie, social dysfunction, 
and insider-outsider behavior. Unintended consequences can result when these social issues are present. These issues 
can occur when localized subcultures shift from the overarching organizational culture, or when the organizational 
culture prevents achievement of system goals.  These sociological principles provide the systems engineer with key 
approaches to manage the information flow through the organization as the disciplines are integrated and share their 
information and provides key sociological barriers to information flow through the organization.  This paper will 
discuss the practical application of sociological principles to systems engineering. 
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Introduction 
Discipline Integration is a critical activity of the systems engineer. Information about the system resides in the 
organization, and information about the system can be filtered or changed as information passes between disciplines. 
This brings into play several practices from sociology.  
The organization is an integration of the disciplines which develop, manufacture, and operate the system. 
The organization itself is a complex system, which is put in place to develop a complex system. Systems engineering 
is focused on the development of elegant systems. Elegant systems are robust in application, fully meeting specified 
and adumbrated intent, are well structured, and are graceful in operation. The relationship between the system being 
developed and the organization is a key factor in system elegance that results from the development process and the 
execution of the manufacturing and operations of the system. Because of these relationships, the systems engineer has 
a special interest in the organizational structure and relationships.  
The organizational structure and relationships are primarily the responsibility of the line organization and the 
program manager. They establish and manage the various disciplines or branches within the organization. These 
relationships form the medium through which the system information flows during the development and operation of 
the system and are vital to the success of the system. The systems engineer must recognize and understand the 
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information flow that occurs through the organization to ensure an elegant system development and operation. The 
systems engineer should work closely with the program or project manager ensuring the organizational structure is 
properly understood, blind spots and information choke points identified, and efficient forms of program organization 
within the line organization (e.g., design team structure, co-location, intra-organization communication, decision 
board structure) are considered. The systems engineer, taking into account how information flows through the 
organization, should recommend an efficient organizational structure and decision board structure to the program or 
project manager. 
Difficulties and inefficiencies within the organization information flow and the board structure change flow 
can result in unintended consequences. Mitigation of these unintended consequences starts with a complete 
understanding of the organization structure and information flow.  
The application of sociological principles is a key aspect of systems engineering who integrate various 
discipline activities and information to produce elegant systems.  The application of these principles to systems 
engineering are discussed in this paper. 
 
Systems Engineering of Elegant Systems: Discipline Integration 
Integrating the disciplines through the organizational structure and ensuring clear and complete communication 
between the disciplines brings in several aspects of sociology, organizational theory, information theory, and cognitive 
science. The applications for each of these is typically different between development organizations and operational 
organizations. This section discusses the integration of the disciplines in both the development and operations life 
cycle phases.  
 
Engineering an Elegant Organization during Development  
Development organizations are intended to generate specific design information, coordinate the information with other 
disciplines within the organization, and integrate it into an elegant system.  
Sociology provides many functions that exist within the organization. Opportunity structures provide an 
opportunity for the disciplines to mature their ideas and resolve questions and unexpected responses prior to carrying 
these through the decision board process. The systems engineer provides for these in the organizational structure and 
information flow process through the formation of informal status meetings, task teams, working groups, communities 
of practice, etc. as appropriate for the organizational culture and specific system development.  
The decision-making process uses these opportunity structures. Different opportunity structures can be used 
for different decisions. The key is in having the correct knowledge involved in the informal and formal decision 
making so that a quality decision is made. Information theory shows the importance of proper knowledge in order to 
make a decision on a specific subject or question. Information theory also provides important guidance in the 
establishment of decision boards, the membership of these boards, and the relationship of delegated boards. The key 
is to establish a system that allows information to flow through the decision-making process with minimal uncertainty 
of the topics, discussions, and results in the organization. 
Reconsideration paths are a key sociological mitigation for those within the organization who encounter a 
social ambivalence on a specific system decision or topic. These boards should not be made up of participants in the 
development organizational culture, but the board members should be able to discern the sociological as well as the 
technical forces contributing to the perceived conflict in the system. This helps mitigate social responses that can lead 
to system design activities or decisions moving outside the organizational structure or attempting to bypass certain 
decision-making steps. 
The systems engineer should be aware that information may reside in the organization, but be unidentifiable 
in the design. A design that does not close may be due to margin in the design but only identifiable by a discipline. 
Before action is taken to significantly change the system, the systems engineer should engage in un-biased information 
sharing with the affected disciplines to determine if there are factors (e.g., margin) which the discipline organization 
can change to support an improved design. The basic approach is to ask questions about conservative estimates, 
uncertainty margins, and actual factors of safety that may indicate design margin not otherwise identified. This may 
be an iterative negotiation process where disciplines slowly release margins as their confidence in the system design 
grows (Austin-Breneman, Yu, & Yang, 2014; Austin-Breneman, Yu, & Yang, 2015; Austin-Breneman, Yu, & Yang, 
2015). 
 
Engineering an Elegant Organization during Operations  
Operations organizations are intended to coordinate specific actions about a system based on a detailed understanding 
of the system’s behaviors and responses defined during the system development. The discipline integration approaches 
are similar to those discussed with development organizations.  
Watson, Andrews, Eckley, & Culver 
 
3 
 
These operational organizations take many forms. Customer service operations organizations need the ability 
to matrix into the engineering teams for defined questions or issues. High reliability organizations (such as those 
encountered in electrical plant operations, ship crews, or spacecraft operations teams) can have a more hierarchical 
structure which flattens during critical operations events to address high risk factors in a timely and successful manner. 
Systems engineering must recognize the organizational constructs, how the engineering team integrates with these 
operations organizations, and how to ensure the correct information flows to the operations teams. 
 
Sociological Principles in Practice 
Sociology provides the basis for many important activities and organizational structures in a system development or 
operations organization. The systems engineer works in concert with both project management and line management.  
The systems engineers focus is on the coherent flow of information through the organization. Sociological factors play 
a large role in information flow and can lead to information flow gaps, barriers, or short circuits through or around the 
organization.  The systems engineering must be aware of the sociological factors in order to ensure the information 
needed for the system development and operations is in the system design or operational procedures and approaches. 
 
Specification of Ignorance 
Developers and operators need to understand what they do not know. The specification of ignorance is a social process 
where one is acknowledging not everything is understood. This forms a basis for the areas of investigation, analysis, 
and test that should occur in order to learn what is presently not known. This is also a strong driver to the specification 
of system risks where uncertainties are specified and dealt with. Risk definition starts with the specification of 
ignorance on a subject(s). 
Systems engineers should identify what the unknowns are about the system.  This can come in a variety of 
forms including system performance, system margins, system sensitivities, system environments, system interactions, 
etc.  This provides important guidance for system analysis, discipline analysis, and development testing to determine 
the unknown system characteristics.  The systems engineer should also be aware of sociological bias that lead to 
statements that there are no unknowns.  This can lead to serious unintended consequences in system capabilities, 
schedule, and budget.   
 
Socially Expected Durations 
The participants in the system development or operation will have an expectation for how long an activity should 
endure. When these expectations are not met, unease can develop in the organization which can lead to social 
ambivalence. The systems engineer must recognize what the socially expected durations are for the various system 
activities. Where new approaches, methods, or structures (e.g., reorganization or realignments)  are applied in the 
organization, it is important that these changes are explained and rationale provided to form a basis to change the 
expectation and mitigate unease developing in the organization. Project managers, organizational line managers, or 
chief engineers can help in explaining the changes to the organization. 
The systems engineer should ensure that the appropriate authority (project management, line management, 
chief engineer, systems engineer) explain the rationale and what their new expectations for project duration will be.  
This is a form of planned renegotiation (Sherwood, J.J., & Glidewell, J.C., 1975) that provides for adjustments in the 
social structure of the project and avoiding potential causes of social ambivalence.  Specifically, changing schedules 
can produce pressure on individuals in the organization which lead to ambivalent situations; situations where assigned 
goals appear to be blocked or unattainable in the new time schedule provided (either shorter or longer). 
 
Consistent Terminology 
The systems engineer has to understand all of the contributing disciplines to the system development or operation. It 
is important, at the system level, to use consistent terminology to aid in clear communication.  
The systems engineer is not responsible for changing discipline terminology but translating terminology to 
ensure communication is clear and consistent. Discipline specific terminology is good and useful within the discipline 
and should not be discouraged. Communication between disciplines and at the system level should use consistent 
terminology. This can be derived from discipline terms, especially when more than one discipline uses and understands 
the term in the same way. Creation of new terms is not the goal; translation of terms is the goal. This will be strongly 
driven by the type of system being developed or operated. Communication with external groups such as stakeholders, 
corporate management, and government agency leadership should also be taken into account when translating and 
establishing a consistent terminology.  
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Opportunity Structures 
Opportunity structures are crucial to the successful development and operation of an elegant system. 
Opportunity structures provide a peer review forum to express, explore, and vet new ideas and approaches in the 
system development or operation. A key characteristic of these structures is that they are not decision-making 
structures. Formal decision-making structures such as decision boards are not opportunity structures and are not 
intended for introduction of new ideas in the midst of a decision. These formal structures depend on the exploration 
of ideas occurring in opportunity structures before a decision is brought to the decision-making body. 
Opportunity structures can have many forms. Communities of Practice (CoP) provide an excellent manner 
for practitioners to share new ideas and perspective, gain feedback and critique, and improve on their idea (or abandon 
an idea shown not to be valid). Design team meetings, in some forms Integrated Product Team (IPT) meetings, provide 
another excellent forum for these types of ideas. It is fine to have an agenda for specific meetings and even a specific 
topic(s) for discussion; however, these should not be decision-making meetings (note that developing a 
recommendation can still be the objective in an opportunity structure). Agile software and agile system approaches 
have these types of structures embedded in their daily and weekly team meetings and provide good approaches for 
some types of systems. Working groups, task teams, status meetings, and other similar type structures also provide 
this when they are not used in a decision-making capacity.  
A key aspect of opportunity structures is providing a forum for everyone with different perspectives on the 
same topic to contribute to the discussion.  Segmented meetings, where different ideas are considered separately are 
not an opportunity structure and appear more as a decisional meeting. To vet ideas fully, it is important to include a 
diverse group of thinking by contributors on the topic and those impacted by the topic. 
The systems engineer should work with project management and line management to ensure opportunity 
structures are available at both the discipline or subsystem level and at the system level. Having these open expression 
forums is essential for the avoidance of unintended consequences (by providing an opportunity to recognize these 
consequences) and development of approaches that provide for an elegant system approach. 
 
Organizational Culture and Cultural Subsets 
There are three lenses from which to view social structure:  individual, group, and organizational. (Page & Page, 
2008).  The individual view deals with roles (i.e., role sets) of individuals within the organization. The group view 
deals with languages and status (i.e., disciplines can have their own technical language and can be viewed as a group).  
The organizational view looks at organizational structure and culture (i.e., project and organizational norms). 
Sociology deals with all three of these views in various forms. This section deals with the organizational view and the 
group view (as it defines a cultural subset). 
There are both manifest and latent social forces at work in the organization.  Manifest social forces are visible 
and direct.  Latent social forces are invisible and indirect (Turner, 1978).  Most of what is addressed in this section 
are the more visible, manifest social forces.  These are visible in policy statements, written norms, and behaviors in 
meetings and discipline interactions.   
Beliefs, assumptions, and behavioral expectations are defined by the culture.  Therefore, expecting 
individuals to act differently than their discipline subculture values is difficult and may not be possible.  The systems 
engineer seeks to relate to individuals within the subcultures in a way that is valued by that discipline. Like the 
technical system, the social system (or culture) can be a source of high performance and competitive advantage if it is 
healthy, or a source of risk if it is unhealthy.  
Culture can be either anticipative (looking for what may happen next and how to respond) or resilient (stable 
and unmoving to change) (Roberto, 2009).  And, once culture has become ingrained in an organization (that is, 
accepted as “the way we do things here”), it can be very difficult to change; and change from anticipative to resilient 
or vice versa can be challenging. The specific culture form is important to understand for the systems engineer.  
Organizational culture can also drift over time, become accepting of anomalies or unknown areas of the 
system.  There can be incremental descents into poor decisions if not addressed. The concept of normalization of 
deviance (Vaughan, 1996), the acceptance of system or organizational behavior that deviates from previous behavior, 
is an example of cultural drift. This is a risk to the system functioning properly and to fulfilling system needs, goals, 
and objectives.  Being able to specify ignorance and address it, not accept it, is a crucial aspect of systems engineering 
(Roberto, 2009). 
Senior management shapes processes and organizational structure through reinforcement of rewards, status, 
resources allocations, and compensation. These influences are meant to engage individuals within the organization to 
contributing behaviors to system success. Systems engineers can recommend individuals, disciplines, and sub-teams 
for recognition using the reinforcement means. Systems engineering recognition should focus on open and honest 
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flow of information through the system contributing to the systems success, even if the information challenges some 
beliefs held by the culture.   
Middle management tends to hold the organizational culture in place.  They are charged with stability and 
they are rewarded based on the cultural values of the organization (Christensen, 2003).  Middle managers can be 
project subsystem leads or chief engineers, organizational unit managers, and discipline leads or managers.  Thus a 
good indicator of organizational culture is to look at this level of management within the organization and project and 
what they actually value. This level of management is important for adoption of new ideas or approaches. Technical 
experts push ideas to middle managers for sponsorship.  If middle management adopts the ideas then the organizational 
structure will drive the project strategy and management will push the idea to senior executives (e.g., department 
managers, project managers, project chief engineers) for sponsorship and decision. (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998) 
Note also that communication flow through managers is more formal and can lead to poor information transfer and 
misunderstandings between disciplines (Roberto, 2009).  There needs to be informal communication among peers 
(i.e., opportunity structures) with input and concurrence by managers.   
The complexity of the system needs to be embraced rather than looking to simplify the understanding of 
interactions (hides information).  There are ambiguous threats to the system and organization that afford time to 
respond if identified and not hidden in the social structure.  Sensitive information needs to be free to share with 
decision makers.  Opportunity structures can help frame these presentations more carefully.  Small problems provide 
a causal chain in the organizational structure that may indicate larger problems.  Looking for blame is localized and 
often misses the broader systemic problems that may exist in the organization. (Roberto, M. A., 2009)   Root cause 
has a specific initiator.  Root cause also has a systemic facilitator or transfer medium. Both exist compatibly to produce 
failures in complex systems and complex organizations.   
Cultural subsets will exist in any complex organization, are natural, and can be based on a variety of cultural 
factors. In an engineering context, engineering disciplines form cultural subsets. The systems engineer should be aware 
that these exist and help to mitigate any actions that impede information flow through the system. This may involve 
discussions with project management and line management to help deal with any insider activities (i.e., activities 
where a group believes they are the only ones who can understand certain facts or information and act to withhold 
access to this from those outside the group). These types of actions can lead to failure of the organization and therefore 
a failure of the system (or result in an inelegant system at best); in extreme cases where social ambivalence and 
dysfunction sets in, these extreme difficulties lead to a disruption in information flow within the organization and 
failure of the system. 
Insider behavior, where organizations withhold ‘private’ information and share more generally known 
information is a serious information flow block. Organizations can also withhold information as a form of leverage or 
power information for fear of failure or loss of control (Roberto, 2009).  Biased Information Sharing is a form of 
information leveraging and filtering where the organization is ensuring that it can be successful with its system 
functions (Austin-Breneman, Yu, & Yang, 2014).  However, this can also be a risk to the system where it can force 
unnecessary design changes (due to more margin being held in the design than is needed and can be supported).  A 
data clearinghouse could be established (some model based systems engineering approaches attempt to do this) but 
the risk is added hierarchical complexity in the information flow.  Peer to peer information flow is crucial, especially 
in complex organizational structures to ensure information is flowing as needed.   
At the discipline level there can be a shift from project policy to local discipline policy (termed practical 
drift).  These policy shifts are typically not explicitly communicated (Snook, 2000).  The systems engineer should 
ensure transparency in information transfer and avoid information silos that can form from local policy differences.  
The systems engineer should ensure that there are clear processes for transfer of system information between the 
disciplines and that the discipline teams understand these.  Note, that these differences can lead to a socially ambivalent 
situation as discussed below. 
Groupthink (Janis, 1982) can occur in trade study teams, working groups, disciplines, subsystems, at the 
project level, etc. Individuals can choose psychological safety and not express counter or dissenting opinions (fear to 
speak up), a serious block in information flow which causes a serious filtering of information flow and can lead to a 
shift or non-assignment of accountability.  This results in hidden information and a lack of responsibility to resolve 
issues.  Groupthink is also dangerous in changing or renegotiation events and leads to a failure to address or adapt to 
the changes needed for system success.  Adding diverse thinkers as members, brining in outside experts,  and cross 
discipline teams may help counter groupthink tendencies.  Moreover, systems engineers participating in teams that 
appear to be operating in groupthink should openly encourage individual discussion and solicit different opinions from 
the team members. The systems engineer needs to recognize groupthink and raise important social conditions or 
system challenges.  
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The systems engineer should recognize and seek to understand these cultures.  This understanding provides 
a key element to communicating with the different subcultures (e.g., disciplines, departments, divisions) within the 
organization in an effective manner.  The intent of systems engineering is not to change the discipline subcultures but 
to effectively integrate the discipline subcultures.  
 
Accumulation of Advantage and Disadvantage 
Sociologically, when an organizational group is highly successful they are rewarded with access to more resources 
and greater opportunity for future success. The opposite is also true. When an organizational group is viewed as not 
being effective (which socially can be real or perceived) then their resources and opportunities are reduced. An elegant 
system requires that the correct engineering be done to meet the system goals. The systems engineer must ensure that 
an appropriate balance is maintained for the organizational effort for the specific system. Organizational units which 
struggle must be provided with necessary corrections (which can be skills, tools, computer time, fabrication priority, 
materials, skills, or leadership) to enable them to provide the needed and appropriate effort for the system. Highly 
successful organizational units should not be given unnecessary resources that do not improve the engineering for the 
system. The balance of engineering to achieve an elegant system is a focus of the systems engineer. 
 
Social Ambivalence  
Sociological ambivalence is an “incompatible normative expectation of attitudes, beliefs, and behavior assigned to a 
social status (i.e., position) or a set of statuses in a society”. An ambivalence can be created if a discipline or position 
within the organization is confronted with conflicting norms. This condition can pose a threat to the system’s success. 
There are six (6) types of sociological ambivalence (quotes in this list are taken from (Merton, 1996, pp. 123-131):   
1. “Inherent in the social position”  
Government employee relationships with contractors are an example where government ethics demands 
disinterest while social etiquette requires personal interest. There are many examples of these types of cases 
in the literature (Roberto, 2009).    
   
2. “A conflict of interests or values” 
These may arise when a person is a member of two different organizations such as in a matrix organizational 
structure or when a person is working two projects. If the normative values are different the person can 
become socially ambivalent. For example, when one project norm is to do what it takes to solve a problem 
conflicts with the time agreed to spend on another project. A conflict in time priority arises where one cannot 
satisfy both norms. These can also arise between organizational values and values from a person’s life outside 
the organization.   
  
3. “Conflict between roles associated with a particular” position 
These are conflicts in cultural norms that occur inherent to a given job position. These can occur in discipline 
integration where a representative to the system team may find oneself in conflict between norms of the 
system team and norms of their discipline team. Another example may be in procurement, balancing the 
norms of the procurement office with that of what the program views as necessary for success. 
 
4. “Contradictory cultural values” 
These can be a risk to the system and occur when different cultural values collide. For example, an emphasis 
on high reliability can conflict with the need to focus only on events or situations seen as credible. High 
reliability is sensitive to even low probability events and requires the organization to address situations that 
the organization may not believe are possible.  This can lead to severe tension and conflict in the organization 
as the organizational cultural beliefs collide with the new high reliability project culture.   
 
5. “The disjunction between culturally prescribed aspirations and socially structured avenues for realizing these 
aspirations”  
This illustrates a disconnect between social expectations and the structure to achieve these expectations. An 
example is when a quick change is needed in the system design or operation and the organizational structure 
does not support a quick assessment and implementation of the change. The engineer is faced with either 
allowing a larger impact to the system later or moving ahead of approval with a change. Systems engineering 
is to ensure that the decision-making structures are efficient and that mechanisms are in place for the types 
of disjunctions in this example. 
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6. That which “develops among people who have lived in two or more societies and so have become oriented 
to differing set of cultural values” 
This occurs when an engineer worked in different disciplines or supported projects with very different 
cultural values. The varying cultural values experienced can lead to ambivalence to cultural values in the 
current system that conflict or contradict what has been successful in the engineer’s past. This can lead to a 
strong disinterest in the social structure of the system development or operation. These types of issues should 
be brought to line management or project management (at the appropriate level) to address. It is important 
that the members of the organization have an agreed to set of values or sociological dysfunction can develop 
within the sociological structure of the organization.   
Sociological ambivalence can lead to a failure to deal with or possibly to acknowledge conditions that affect 
system reliability and success. Systems engineering must be aware of these conditions when they occur in the 
organization and seek to find a new balance for the norms. This may involve the precedence of conflicting norms 
elevating one as more prominent to resolve a conflict or finding a common understanding that balances the norms, 
and addressing the concerns that may be suppressed in the ambivalent situation. 
An extreme sociologically ambivalent context leads to sociological anomie. In this case an individual in the 
culture can become normless or rootless (Merton, 1996, pp. 132-152). A no win situation has been perceived where 
an individual moves outside the organizational structure and opposes the organizational norms to achieve what the 
sociological culture calls for and the organizational structure is preventing. This imbalance occurs when the emphasis 
on success-goals of the system are much greater than the emphasis on the institutional means to achieve these goals. 
There are five (5) types of individual adaptations to the social structure disjunctions. 
1. Conformity 
Most people seek to conform to the cultural norms and the social structure to achieve these norms. They will 
try to stay within these bounds as they work in the organization.  This can lead to failure to achieve 
assignments as individuals seek to conform to the social structure. 
 
2. Innovation 
Individuals caught in a conflict between the cultural norms and social structure may try to create a new path 
through the social structure. This typically involves violating some minor cultural norm or organizational 
constraint to resolve the conflict (or organizational pinch) that they are in. An example may be in skipping a 
level in the chain of command or bypassing an approval cycle to move forward. There are many more creative 
ways that people may find to move forward in satisfying a cultural norm that the social structure is not 
facilitating. Social structure in this case would include the formal approval cycle (e.g., decision making 
boards). The systems engineer needs to recognize when information is moving outside the project structure 
and seek to address the perceived barriers that are leading to this deviation. 
 
3. Ritualism 
In some cases, the frustration in conflicts can lead to an abandonment or reduction in importance to achieving 
a cultural norm leading to a ritualistic following of the organizational structure processes. This can be 
dangerous to the system as ambivalence has developed and conflicts in the system design or operation may 
not be identified as discussed above.  This often leads to a failure to accomplish goals as the social structure 
is given precedence. 
  
4. Retreatism 
Occasionally an individual will retreat from both the cultural norms and the organizational structure. A person 
who is in such an ambivalent situation simply withdraws from significant participation in the system 
development or design. When this occurs, the person should seek a different position in the project or with 
another project where the conflict they have encountered does not exist. These cases should be discussed 
with line management or project management at an appropriate level. Systems engineering is focused on the 
success of the system. When these deep sociological conflicts develop, line management is primarily 
responsible to help the individual deal with the conflict. Systems engineering is responsible to ensure the 
conflict does not indicate an issue in organizational culture values or structure that needs to be addressed.    
 
5. Rebellion 
This is the most radical of the responses to sociological anomie situations. Rebellion is a strong form of social 
dysfunction attempting to bring about a new social structure within the organization. This can occur in cases 
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were an organization views the success of the system based on different values than are required for the 
system in application. This can occur when a traditional organization attempts to adapt to a disruptive 
technological approach. As discussed above, this may mean the organization is not suited to the system 
development or operation.  Disgruntled employees can fall into this type of social response.  
Dealing with these various levels of social ambivalence, the systems engineer has to deal with the pinch that 
leads to the ambivalence.  Disruptions to the social structure leads to uncertainty in what the actual organizational 
expectations are for accomplishing a task. Individually this can lead to anxiety. Organizationally this also opens the 
door for potential renegotiation of social expectations (i.e., a process change is possible) based on new understandings 
of what is necessary for a successful system. Note that this is also accompanied by social resistance to change which 
can be strong.  This social resistance seeks to keep the social structure the same and needs to be managed with line 
management and project management to help correct the ambivalent situation.  Middle management, who are changed 
with maintaining organizational stability, are often sources of resistance to organizational change (Christensen, 2003). 
The anxiety response can be a driving force for the methods discussed below: 
• Innovate by renegotiating expectations within the social structure 
• Retreat from the situation, terminating efforts toward the task 
• Ritualism by returning to the previous social structure expectations which leads to a failure of the task.  
This may be seen through an apology to not be able to do the task (i.e., returning to the previous social 
structure expectation) or some other means of expressing an understanding of the problem with an 
inability to deal with the obstacles to address the task.  If the return to previous expectations (a closed 
response to change) is not feasible for the system progress, the organization and system can fail. 
If the social ambivalence is not addressed, it can lead to repetitive and more intense disruptions of the 
organizational relationships.  The previous disruptions feed the intensity of future disruptions.  The systems engineer 
needs to be aware of this cycle and work with project and line management to address the imbalance in the 
organizational structure.  Staying on the status quo (i.e., being inflexible), and not addressing the imbalance in the 
organization, can lead to significant organizational, project, and system failures (Sherwood & Glidewell, 1975). 
One possible avenue for dealing with these organizational imbalances which social ambivalence indicates, is 
to plan to renegotiate social expectations and arrangements as a part of the system development or operations activity.  
This is a form of reclama process (discussed more below) and allows the organization to adjust to unforeseen needs 
in the system development and operation as the organization gains a better understanding of the system and the 
approaches to successfully develop an elegant system. When an imbalance occurs, the organization can use this 
renegotiation process to develop a more fitting balance for the system.  This relieves the anxiety produced by a socially 
ambivalent circumstance and allows the organization to flex and accommodate the system needs.  A more stable 
renegotiation is allowed through this planning.  As the organization experiences this response to imbalances, the 
planned renegotiation process acts as a stabilizing force in the social expectations for the project (Sherwood & 
Glidewell, 1975). 
One of the signs of a socially ambivalent situation is sometimes referred to as a ‘pinch’ (Sherwood & 
Glidewell, 1975). As individuals begin to feel a pinch, an organizational disruption is developing.  Signs of a pinch 
are increased tension in meetings and discussions on how to proceed with a need in the system development.  Stress 
levels become visible as the pinch increases.  Sources of this anxiety based stress include the impression that freedom 
to pursue a course of action has been restricted, responsibility has been removed or replaced, resources are reallocated 
between groups, and system needs, goals, and objectives (NGO) are shifting which change the importance of certain 
approaches or disciplines. These are all social stresses that need to be managed in conjunction with project 
management and line management.  The systems engineer should be aware that these factors will cause stress in the 
organization and individuals and seek to restore a balance based on the needs of the successful elegant system 
development or operation.  
 
Social Dysfunction 
Social dysfunction is “any process that undermines the stability of survival of a social system” (Merton, 1996, pp. 96-
100). Systems engineering helps to mitigate dysfunctions that can cause information about the system to be suppressed 
or inaccurately communicated. These dysfunctions are a risk factor for the system and can greatly affect the ability of 
an organization to accomplish a given system design or operation.  Note, that innovative approaches to accomplishing 
a system can be very disruptive to an organizations sociological values. This can mean that a given organizational 
culture is not able to develop the system which embodies values contrary to what the organization has come to believe 
as most important. Innovative system approaches often entail the formation of an entirely new organizational structure 
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and culture with a different view on what is most significant in the system. Examples can be found in various industries 
including the computer industry (mainframe vs networked workstations), heavy equipment industry (steam driven 
systems vs hydraulic systems), medical practice, etc. (Christensen, 2003)  Another current example in United States 
culture is automation of previously manual operations (i.e., anxiety toward drone applications).   
 
Reconsideration Process 
The reconsideration process, or reclama process, is a crucial sociological mitigation forum within the organizational 
structure. The systems engineer ensures that project management or line management has established a process for 
appeal or reconsideration of decisions about the system, organization, or project structure. This provides those who 
find themselves in a socially ambivalent situation (i.e., given an objective to achieve and find the organizational 
structure does not support accomplishment of that objective) to have an avenue to address the ambivalent situation. 
The reconsideration process should be able to recognize and handle organizational biases that exist and may be leading 
to unrecognized and unintended consequences. Thus, the reconsideration process provides an avenue to mitigate 
unintended consequences in decisions about the system, project structure, and organization.  
 
Summary 
Systems engineering involves the application of sociological principles in integrating the disciplines within an 
organization for the development or operation of a system.  The sytems engineer is focused on the flow of information 
about the system through the organization rather than on the management of the organization (the line managers 
responsibility) or management of the project (the project manager’s responsibility).  The systems engineer should 
work with line management and project management to understand the system information flow to help address gaps, 
blocks, or other disruptions in the information flow.  The systems engineer should establish opportunity structures to 
provide a mechanism to vet ideas before they are introdcuced into a decision making process.  Specification of 
ignorance is a key aspect in a successful system development.  Knowing what is not known is essential to addressing 
and resolving system issues. It is important to ensure a consistent system terminology is used, translating and not 
changing, discipline based terminology.  Socically expected durations are important to manage.  Activites or events 
which occur much longer or shorter than socially expected can cause distress within the organization and uncertainty 
about whether the activity or event is being considered seriously by management.  Systems engineers mainly focus on 
manifest social functions, though latent social functions also exist (and are more difficult to identify).  Ensuring 
resources are allocated based on need for the system and not based on the social views of a team are important to a 
successful system. Social ambivalence should be avoided in the functioning of the organization.  This involves being 
aware when organizational expectations are not supported by the organizational structure.  Serious social issues can 
arise including anomie and dysfunction if these organizational disconnects are not addressed.  The reclama process 
can help aleviate some of these situations when they arise. Understanding these social principles equips the systems 
engineer to recognize information between disciplines in the organizations and disruptions to this information flow.  
Applying these sociological principles enables the systems engineer to manage the information flow throughout the 
organization and is essential to a successful system. 
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